A New Strategy for Deterrence and Rollback with North Korea
Q. What are the biggest differences between the policy of
deterrence and rollback outlined in the article to the approach the United
States employed against the Soviets during the Cold War? Do you believe the
policy can work? Explain why or why not.
This is one of the better articles I've seen that lays out a realistic way ahead for North Korea. As the authors state in the article, there are some key differences between the current situation and the Cold War. The international community cannot accept North Korea as a "legitimate" nuclear-armed state for several reasons...mainly the erratic behavior of Kim Jong Un, and the fact that North Korea is not a peer competitor to the U.S., and is seeking to be a nuclear state in order to "level the playing field", so to speak. To me, a nuclear-armed North Korea is/should be unacceptable to the international community, to include Russia and China.
ReplyDeleteCan the proposed policy ("coercive diplomacy" and deterrence) work? I believe it can, but only if we can get China (and Russia, to a lesser extent) on board. Stability on the Korean peninsula is in the best interest of the entire region, so those countries should step up and push North Korea to an acceptable solution. Of course there must be a credible military option on the table for any diplomacy to work, but here's to hoping that the other elements of national power can bring us to a solution short of nuclear war.
As the article points out, there seems to be a false dichotomy of perceived options for the future with North Korea-- either all-out nuclear war or diplomacy. In reality, there are several middle-ground options that when combined, have the potential to form an effective strategy.
ReplyDeleteSome of the main differences between the Cold War scenario and North Korea's current situation include the following:
1. The US and the international community do not accept North Korea as a legitimate nuclear-armed state.
2. Whereas the Soviet Union was a peer competitor, North Korea is significantly weaker than the US in every dimension of power.
3. North Korea has shown no interest in a more stable strategic relationship with the US as the Soviet Union did.
The proposed solution has the potential to work as long as the US is able to construct the right coalition with other regional super-powers (China, Russia) in addition to its current allies (Japan, South Korea). I concur with CSM Nelson that it would be really nice to avoid a nuclear war.
CPT Roger Mulholland
XO, 142 MI
I really enjoyed that this article avoided talking about the situation as if Kim Jeong Un is a crazy man with a plan to destroy the world. Instead it seems that they realized that while his regime is taking drastic steps to increase power, their end goal isn't a nuclear war. With that said, while I'm a bit rusty on the Cold War Situation, I would agree with CPT Mullholland's statements.
ReplyDeleteAs to whether or not the policy would work, I believe it has a very strong possibility as long as it is consistently implemented with out concession. Especially since, DPRK has no way to sustain itself and relies heavily on outside support to maintain it's already difficult existence.
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ReplyDeleteNo, I don't believe that the the current policy will work, but I do agree that it's the only realistic and sensible option we currently can execute at this time. As we've seen in the news, Chinese & Russian vessels have been spotted entering and exiting DPRK ports, for known and unknown reasons.This is slap in the face to the international community and undermines the US, and the rest of the world by cancelling out some of the desired affects were trying to achieve with sanctions.
ReplyDeleteI believe for the US to be successful in negotiating things peacefully, we need continue to strengthen South Korea and Japan with upgraded missile defense systems and to continue joint military drills across South Korea.
CPT Bringhurst
Great feedback team!
ReplyDeleteOne of the biggest differences between the policy of deterrence and roll back outlined in the article versus the policy of containment used against the USSR is the nature of the regime/military for which it's designed. Containment worked against the Soviets because they were a peer competitor and could not be militarily defeated without resulting in "mutually assured destruction". They presented an existential threat to the U.S., meaning they could end our existence as a Nation if they released their nuclear capability.
The North Koreans are not peer competitors militarily nor do they possess an existential nuclear capability against the U.S. On the other hand, we possess an existential capability to the North Koreans. Additionally, the North Koreans are very susceptible to coercion in the form of sanctions and negotiation from the U.S., China, and Russia.
I believe the policy outlined in the paper can work and is one of the best I've seen in terms of realistic way forward. It makes clear there are alternatives that can result in a positive outcome short of war.
As mentioned by others, main differences between Russian and N. Korean strategy were:
ReplyDelete1) Legitimacy of Russian nuclear power vs. N. Korea attempting to force recognition of its nuclear power as legitimate. North Korea has long referred to it's self as "a shrimp among whales" indicating it's pleasure that as a small country it can swim with and manipulate larger nations. Nuclear power aides to solidify N. Korea's place.
2) MAD. Russia was a near-peer (Here at the school house they say the language has been shifting to call them a peer) force. The proliferation and deterrence strategy used included ensuring that neither country had a distinct advantage if nuclear war was initiated.
This is not the case with N. Korea. Regardless of the fact that N. Korea is unable to match US power on any dimension, if it were to initiate or participate in Nuclear war it would not survive, whereas the US certainly would. Furthermore, it is more likely that N. Korea would expend effort on attacking more vulnerable partners of the United States (S. Korea, Japan, Guam, etc) in the Asian region than on a direct attack. The United States, while marred by nuclear war would exit victorious.
As a result, it is the partner nations, which are basically being held as ransom, that the United States becomes responsible for. N. Korea has no incentive to abandon their nuclear program and have been very clear that they will not stop developing capabilities, whereas Russia saw a strategic benefit to denuclearize. Both strategic positions, while different, hold a common thread: Patience.
For Russia, patient cooperation has placed them in a position of peer status. For North Korea patience noncooperation has led them to nuclear ability. America lacks the ability to maintain a global strategy longer than one decade. As a result, China and other powers that undermine sanctions against N. Korea need only to be patient.
I don't believe that this or any strategy will keep N. Korea from continuing their effort to bully its will on others unless the regime is replaced with one that is sympathetic to the global community. This strategy may work to reduce the threat today, but in 10 or 20 years N. Korea will be seen as a legitimate nuclear power and and persistent threat.
After reading the article I couldn't help but ponder just how critical it is to have not only experts in language but experts in culture. In such a complex environment, our ability to understand the adversary's point of view and interests is vital. I appreciate the author of the article for advocating a long-term approach and addressing issues with popular responses to North Korea. Do I think deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and rollback will work over time? My response is that we will be successful inasmuch as we can understand our enemy and auxiliary stakeholders and translate that into synchronized decisive action. I think it is highly appropriate that our senior leaders have emphasized readiness recently as it implies a need for a more agile and adaptive force. With an increase of complexity in the world on the rise, our ability to predict future circumstances is hindered greatly. General McChrystal addressed this dynamic in his book "Team of Teams." In the book, in order to function in a complex environment, he highlights a need to facilitate a broadened awareness of situations and operate with enhanced synergy across multiple lines of effort. To me, this statement implies quite a bit, not the least of which is simply enhancing our ability to work in harmony with people. Perhaps as 300th soldiers our piece of the puzzle in all of this lies in an aptitude for interpersonal and cultural skills. I don't know what the next major conflict will entail, but I am confident that it will be more complex than those previous to it.
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