Strategy-Policy Mismatch
Based on your review of the article, why is there a WMD-E
strategy-policy mismatch? What individual efforts can officers make to shrink
the delta on any given strategy-policy mismatch?
Leading Like a Gardener
Q. Do you agree/disagree with the concept of "leading like a gardener?" Explain your answer.
Part 1: Based on your review of the article, why is there a WMD-E strategy-policy mismatch?
ReplyDeleteThe reason I believe there is a mismatch of the strategic policy has to do with capacity and capability. The Defense Strategic Guidance identifies WMD as one of the greatest threats to the American Forces; however, we do not receive the training or tools/equipment to eliminate these WMDs. If this was in fact a top priority we would receive at a minimum bi-annual training and equipment necessary to eliminate the danger of WMD.
Part 2: What individual efforts can officers make to shrink the delta on any given strategy-policy mismatch?
For us as individual officers to shrink the delta on any given strategy-policy mismatch is to first know that there is a mismatch. If we are going through our careers and lives without knowing the problem exists, we will never be able to do anything about it let alone solve the problem. It is our responsibility to stay current on the requirements from our Commander in Chief and the DOD. Then once we have identified or discovered a mismatch we must seek out the training and equipment necessary to accomplish the missions identified. Then we will be more prepared than when we started.
The old adage in the MI is, “We don’t know what we don’t know.” It is our job to do the critical analysis to determine the gaps and in this instance the mismatch and do our best to resolve the problem.
As with any new piece of knowledge I gain, I am always looking for another way to tease my Marine Corp brothers and sisters, thank you Rand Corporation for the below jewel! Also, plus 10 for using the word quintessentially.
ReplyDelete"Ground forces are especially well suited to performing the WMD-E mission, and
Army forces are particularly capable in this regard: They are quintessentially joint and
ultimately expandable, given that sufficient resources are provided to bring this military
policy option into better alignment with national security strategy."
Now in all seriousness, onto the discussion on the WMD-E policy mismatch. It is my personal belief that we cannot consider ourselves to be "serious" about a subject unless we dedicate time, effort, and money to a cause. After reading the article, it is clear that the mismatch occurs in how the time, effort and money are applied towards the policy of WMD-E.
We claim to be throwing money at the issue; however, as MAJ Adamson mentions in his article above, we have not seen that money trickle down to the BN level, nor have we observed the infamous annual training requirement produced. This leads me to believe that we are merely providing lip service to the policy WMD-E.
I believe we can find one of the reasons for this lack of focus in the article itself. The article begins by discussing WMD's as if they are a known and quantifiable by all readers. The author does not attempt to quantify what fits within the realm of WMD. I find this troublesome as I have spent my entire military career fighting a war on the intangible “terror” with no clear end in sight. Maybe the elitists at Rand can provide the Webster’s dictionary definition of what exactly constitutes a WMD but the rest of us are stuck with a range from Nuclear Arsenal to Biological Bottle Rocket.
This leads me to the individual responsibility we have as officers in the United States Army. We must provide as clear a definition as possible to our Soldiers. We must work diligently to avoid emotional rhetoric that confuses our mission and softens our resolve (ex. “War on Terror, War on Poverty, War on WMD’s?).
We cannot let our humanity override the realities of others depravity.
Respectfully,
CW2 Holgreen
I think the WMD-E strategy policy mismatch, ultimately boils down to military strength, training, resources and budget. I’m under the impression that this will always be an issue, because we don’t have a unlimited budget and we don’t know where the next threat will emerge from. Our priorities will continue to shift, depending on the current state and the current situation around the world.
ReplyDeleteOfficers will continue to lead and train soldiers to adapt, overcome and thrive in any situation. We need to continue to study and identify emerging threats and trends around the world. We need to encourage the use of technology to enhance the capabilities of the individual soldier on the battlefield, increasing their overall capacity to conduct these types of C-WMD/ WMD-E missions and eliminate waste on the battlefield. Overall, allowing us to dictate and move the current policy left or right as the nation sees fit.
CPT Bringhurst
Great feedback MAJ Adamson, CW2 Holgreen, and CPT Bringhurst! I've always found it interesting to review the national level strategy documents and see what they say are DoD's most important "ends" (i.e. strategy), only to consider how the "ways" and "means" (i.e. policy/resources) don't align. This article is a classic example of that misalignment.
ReplyDeleteIn some cases, bridging the gap at the BN or lower level can be managed. In other cases, it's nearly impossible. What's important is to do as MAJ Adamson says; we've got to be aware of what those strategies are in order to know how a policy can be best addressed. Implementation at the lowest level will affect the outcome of those strategies.
An example of this occurred with me when I was a CPT. The Walter Reed scandal of poor treatment of wounded, injured, and ill Soldiers happened in early 2007. The Secretary of the Army was fired because of it and the situation quickly became a full blown crisis! The strategy of providing first class care to our wounded, injured, and ill Soldiers at Walter Reed and at Army medical facilities across the Army was in no way in alignment with the policies that supported it.
By late 2007, Warrior Transition Units were being stood up at all of the major posts in the Army. In December of 2007, I was selected to stand up one of those Companies at Ft Drum, NY (Climb to Glory!!!). While the Department of Army (DA) wanted to do a better job of taking care of wounded, injured, and ill Soldiers (the "end"), there was a lot they hadn't figured out ("ways" and "means"). As a Company Commander of a WTU Company, it was up to me to help figure it out. There was a lot of discovery learning that happened in that first year, but eventually we (my CO, BN, BDE, and DA) worked through most of that and were aligning the strategy with the policies that supported it.
It was very satisfying to be part of making things right with those Soldiers who had given so much. By understanding the strategy, we were able to align the policy so that the two were no longer mismatched, but in alignment.